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Not all changes in the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee’s (FOMC’s) target for the federal funds rate reflect a
change in the stance of monetary policy. Hence, the FOMC
could provide more information about its monetary policy
objective by announcing whether specific target changes
reflect a change in the stance of monetary policy or are
responses to changing economic conditions intended to
maintain the current policy.
Such a practice has precedent: Beginning in 1963, the
Fed began announcing whether specific discount rate
changes reflected a change in the stance of policy or merely
realigned the discount rate with market interest rates. Prior
to 1963, it was difficult for market analysts to distinguish
between “policy” and “technical” discount rate changes
and, consequently, the market reacted to all discount rate
changes. When the Fed began announcing the extent to
which discount rate changes were made for technical as
opposed to policy reasons, the market no longer reacted
to purely technical discount rate adjustments. The Fed’s
announcements appear to have eliminated uncertainty
about why the discount rate was changed.1
An analogous problem exists for interpreting changes
in the FOMC’s funds rate target. Unlike the discount rate,
the federal funds rate is determined by the market. The
FOMC merely sets a target for the funds rate. In the
absence of offsetting action by the Fed, the funds rate,
like all market rates, responds to changing economic
conditions. For example, an increase in expected inflation
will tend to cause market interest rates, including the funds
rate, to rise. Similarly, the onset of a recession or period
of slow economic growth will cause the real rate of interest
to fall and put pressure on the funds rate to decline as
well. If the FOMC resists these pressures in order to main-
tain its target for the funds rate, it will, in effect, change
the stance of monetary policy. For example, if changing
inflation expectations put pressure on the funds rate to
rise, the FOMC must ease policy if it desires to maintain
its existing funds rate target. On the other hand, the stance
of monetary policy is unchanged if the FOMC raises its
target rate to correspond to the increase in expected infla-
tion. Monetary policy becomes tighter only if the FOMC
raises its target by more than enough to accommodate the
increase in expected inflation. Similarly, if the FOMC does
not wish to change the stance of monetary policy when
economic forces are driving nominal interest rates down,
it must reduce its funds rate target by precisely the amount
of the effect of the changed economic circumstances.
The endogenous behavior of the funds rate under an
unchanged monetary policy is illustrated by the so-called
Taylor rule, shown on page 10. The Taylor rule can be
derived from a model in which policymakers set a funds
rate target in an attempt to minimize a specific weighted
average of the deviations of inflation from a target and
output (real GDP) from potential output. The funds rate
target is changed in response to changes in the rate of
inflation or output growth, relative to targeted inflation
and potential output; however, the stance of monetary
policy is unchanged so long as the policymaker does not
change the weights he assigns to the inflation and output
objectives. While the FOMC has never followed the Taylor
rule, it illustrates the sense in which changes in the funds
rate need not correspond to changes in monetary policy. 
Because interest rates are affected by many of the
same economic forces that cause policymakers to adjust
their target for the funds rate, it is difficult to know whether
a change in the target represents a change in stance of
monetary policy or is merely an effort by the FOMC to
maintain the existing stance of policy. In practice, it is
difficult even for the FOMC to gauge how much the funds
rate would move in the absence of actions to maintain it.
Nevertheless, the FOMC could enhance the transparency
of monetary policy by announcing whether target changes
are intended to change the stance of monetary policy,
maintain it, or reflect some of each.
—Daniel L. Thornton
1See Thornton: “Lifting the Veil of Secrecy from Monetary Policy: Evidence
from the Fed’s Early Discount Rate Policy.” Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, May 2000, 32(2), pp. 155-67.
Available on the web at research.stlouisfed.org